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CASES NOTED
that the court, by the very act of setting up the judicial department, creates a
state bar as an integrated whole. Such an integrated bar needs recognition
only) 0
If the supreme court has the power to integrate the bar, it also has, under
the doctrine of implied powers, the right to do everything necessary to make
integration effective. 1 ' A nominal fee, or suspension from practice on the
failure to pay it, was held in In re Gibson as not denying equal protection
and due process.1 2 The court stated that a penalty designed solely to enforce
payment of a bar integration fee was not void as arbitrary or unreasonable. 18
The English bar was integrated early in its history, and during the
past thirty-five years, some twenty-seven states have followed suit.' 4 The
discipline of unethical practitioners is only an incidental objective of the
integrated bar. Rather, integration is designed to awaken an interest in the
science of jurisprudence, improve the administration of justice, and to give
the bar a true concept of its relation to the public and to the profession.
Florida has stepped into line with the majority of states who view integration
as a means of giving the bar this new and enlarged concept of its position in
our social and economic pattern.

FEDERAL PROCEDURE-DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP AS
APPLIED TO CITIZENS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
The plaintiff corporation, organized under the laws of the District of
Columbia, brought a civil action against a Virginia corporation in the Federal
District Court of Maryland, jurisdiction being predicated upon an allegation
of diversity of citizenship under the 1940 amendment to the Judicial Code.'
This amendment provided in effect that citizens of the District of Columbia
would be considered citizens of a state for purpose of diversity of citizenship.
Defendant contended the statute was unconstitutional in that it extended
jurisdiction beyond the limits of Article III, § 2 of the Constitution. 2 The trial
court held that while this diversity met requirements under the Act of Congress, it did not comply with diversity requirements of the Constitution as
to federal jurisdiction. Held, on certiorari to the Supreme Court, extension
10. In re Nebraska State Bar Association, supra; In re Day, 181 Ill. 73, 54 N. E.
646 (1899) ; see In re Branch, 70 N. J. L. 537, 576, 57 Atd. 431 (1904).
11. E.g.. Goer v. Taylor, 57 N. D. 732, 22 N. W. 898 (1924); Jackson v. Gallett,
30 Iowa 382, 228 Pac. 1068 (1924); State ex rel. McCloskey v. Greathouse, 55 Nev.
409, 36 P.2d 357 (1934); Dreidel v. City of Louisville, 268 Ky. 659, 105 S. W.2d 807
(1937).
12. 35 N. M. 550, 4 P.2d 643 (1931).
13. Id. at 650.

14. Petition of Florida State Bar Association, supra at 905.
1. 54

STAT.

143 (1940), 28 U. S. C. § 41 (1) (1946).

2. U. S. CoNsT. Art. III, § 2. "The judicial power shall extend ...

...

between citizens of different States ..

"

to controversies
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of diversity jurisdiction of federal courts to include citizens of the District of
Columbia was not violative of the Constitution. National Mut. Ins. Co. of
Districtof Columbia v.Tidewater Transfer Inc., 69 Sup. Ct. 1173 (1949).

Prior to the 1940 amendment to the Judicial Code, decisions based on
Hepburn v.Ellzeys had firmly established that the District of Columbia was
not a "state" within the meaninig of Article 111, § 2 of the Constitution, and
that the citizens of the District of Columbia were not entitled to bring actions
into the federal courts on the basis of diversity of citizenship. 4 The construction given the word "state" and the view taken by Chief Justice Marshall in
the Hepburn case had been criticized, but the courts were loathe to overrule
it.6
In 1940, the amendment to the Judicial Code extended jurisdiction of
federal courts to citizens of the District of Columbia and the Territories of the
United States.8 Passage of this amendment gave rise to three diverse views
as to its constitutionality. One view placed the Act under Article III, § 2,
contending that the word "state" should not be given the strict and narrow
construction attached to it in the Hepburn case, but should be construed
liberally to include the District of Columbia.7 Another view upholding the
validity of the amendment placed it under Article I, contending that since
Congress has the power to legislate for the District of Columbia and the Territories, it must necessarily have the power to extend to them the privileges
of using the Federal Courts in actions between parties of diverse citizenship. 8
The third view held the amendment invalid, not only on the basis of the
Hepburn case, but also contending that even though under Article I Congress
may legislate for the District of Columbia, its power is limited to those boundaries and cannot be extended beyond it to affect citizens of other states. 9
3. 2 Cranch 445 (U. S. 1805).
4. Hooe v. Jamieson, 166 U. S. 395 (1897); Barney v. Balto City, 6 Wall. 280
(U. S. 1868) ; Corp. of New Orleans v. Winter, 1 Wheat. 91 (1816) ;Anderson v. U. S.
Fidelity Guaranty Co., 8 F.2d 428 (S. D. Fla. 1925).
5. See Watson v. Brooks, 13 Fed. 540. 543 (C. C. D. Ore. 1882).
6. Duze v. Wooley, 72 F. Supp. 422 (D. Hawaii 1947) ; Dykes and Keefe, The 1940
Amendment to the Diversity of Citizenship Clause, 21 TULANE L. REv. 171 (1946).
7. Pembia Consolidated Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S. 181 (1888); Paul v.
Virginia, 8 Wall. 169 (U. S. 1869) ; 46 CoL L. Rav. 125 (1946) ; 21 TEx. L. Rav. 83
(1942).
8. Glazier v. Acacia Mutual Life Ass'n., 55 F. Supp. 925 (N. D. Cal. 1944) ; Winkler
v. Daniels, 43 F. Supp. 265 (E.D. Va. 1942). The judiciary committee of the House of
Representatives recommended the act ". . . as a reasonable exercise of the constitutional
power to legislate for the District of Columbia and Territories ...." H. R. REP. No.
1756, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess. 3 (1940) ; see Central States Co-ops v. Watson Bros. Transport Co., 165 F.2d 392, 399 (C. C. A. 7th 1947). But see National Mut. Ins. Co. of District of Columbia v. Tidewater Transfer Inc., 165 F.2d 531, 536 (C. C. A. 4th 1947).
9. Central States Co-ops v. Watson Bros. Transportation Co., supra; Mutual Benefit
Health & Accident Ass'n. v. Dailey, 75 F. Supp. 832 (D. Md. 1948) ; Feeley v. Sidney S.
Schipper Interstate Hauling System, 72 F. Supp. 663 (D. Md. 1947); Wilson v. Guggenheim, 70 F. Supp. 417 (E.D. S. C. 1947) ; Willis v. Dennis, 72 F. Supp. 853 (W. D. Va.
1947); Ostrow v. Samuel Brilliant Co., 66 F. Supp. 593 (D. Mass. 1946); Behlert v.
James Foundation Inc., 60 F. Supp. 706 (S.D. N. Y.1945) ; McGarry v. City of Bethlehem, 45 F. Supp. 385 (E.D. Pa. 1942).
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These diverse views have been carried over to the instant case in the
majority, concurring and dissenting opinions. Three Justices '0 of the majority
opinion held that the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts under Article
III is not limited by that section; Congress has plenary powers under Article
I to vest federal courts with jurisdiction. However, the concurring opinion
vigorously dissented from this view, but upheld the act on the ground that
the majority opinion had in effect 11 overruled the decision in Hepburn v.
Ellzey, which gave the word "state" a narrow meaning for purposes of Article
III, by saying the District of Columbia was a state for purposes of diversity
of citizenship. The four dissenting justices in two opinions argued that Article
I does not give Congress power to vest Article III courts with additional
jurisdiction, and that the word "state" is limited in Article III, § 2.
In defining the source of federal jurisdiction, courts have often confused
the source of federal power with the source of federal jurisdiction.12 The exclusive source of federal authority is the Constitution. Article III confers some
jurisdiction to the federal courts, but this does not necessarily mean that
Article III is the exclusive source of federal judicial power. The Supreme
Court has implicitly recognized this distinction in several cases,13 and it has
explicitly recognized that courts organized by Congress in the District of
Columbia derive functional power from Article I rather than from Article
III.' 4 It is asserted that reliance upon Article I power to extend the privilege
of using the federal courts in actions between parties of diverse citizenship
to the people of the District of Columbia is a valid and realistic approach to
the problem.
In view of the relative flexibility given to other words in Article III, § 2,
the argument for a strict construction of the word "state" is rendered relatively impotent. Article III speaks of actions between citizens, and corporations are nowhere mentioned. But an irrebuttable presumption arises that all
members of a corporation are citizens of the state where the corporation was
organized. 15 Hence, for purposes of diversity of citizenship, a corporation is
10. Jackson, J. announced the judgment of the Court and an opinion in which Black
and Burton, J. J., joined, basing the validity of the Act on Article I. Rutledge and Murphy
joined in the judgment, but strongly dissented as to the reasons assigned to support it by Jackson, J., their reason being that the Act is valid under Article II1. Two dissenting opinions
by Frankfurter and Vinson, J. J., in which Reed and Douglas, J. J. joined respectively,
state that the Act is not within either Article I or Article III.
11. Justice Jackson, with whom Justice Black and Justice Burton concurred, expressly stated that they were not overruling Hepburn v. Ellzey.
12. E.g., Hodgson v. Bomerbank, 5 Cranch 303 (U. S. 1809); see 55 YALE L. J.
600, 601 (1946) ; 47 HAtV. L. Rxv. 133, 134 (1933) ; Go. WAsH. L. REv. 84, 86 (1933) ;
22 Go. L. J. 91, 94 (1933); Katz, FederalLegislative Courts, 43 HAnv. L. REv. 894 (1930).
13. Williams v. United States, 289 U. S. 553 (1933); United States v. Duell, 172
U. S. 576 (1899) ; United States v. Coe, 155 U. S. 76 (1894) ; Kendall v. United States,
12 Pet. 524 (U. S. 1838).
14. O'Donohue v. United States, 289 U. S. 516 (1933) ; see 2 GEo. WAsH. L. REv.
84 (1933).
15. Doctor v. Harrington, 196 U. S. 579 (1905).
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treated as if it were a citizen of the state where it is incorporated.1 6 Likewise,
national banks are, for purposes of private actions, ".

.

. deemed citizens of

the State in which they are respectively located." 11 (Emphasis added). It is
submitted that if illogical fictions such as these can extend jurisdiction by
calling organizations "citizens for the purpose of diversity of citizenship," it
is not too great a stretch to call the District of Columbia a "state" for the
purpose of diversity of citizenship. Congress resorted to this fiction. In 1948,
when it reenacted in substance the 1940 amendment, it included that, "The
word 'state' as used in this section includes the Territories and the District
of Columbia." I

The Territories and the District of Columbia are not states in the same
sense as Florida, Michigan or New York, but they are defined territories
with a distinct government and a settled population made up mainly of citizens
of the United States. They are perhaps enough like states to be treated like
them for the purpose of diversity of citizenship. As pointed out, jurisdiction
based on fictions is not new. At least the present language appeals strongly
to the lawyer's instinct to reach a fair result by giving an old word a new
meaning.

MONOPOLIES-APPLICATION OF CLAYTON ACT
TO FORBID EXCLUSIVE SUPPLY CONTRACTS
An injunction was sought by the United States Government to prevent
defendant from enforcing or entering into exclusive supply contracts with any
independent dealer in petroleum products and automobile accessories. The
allegedly monopolistic contracts were of several types, but all provided that
the dealer was to purchase from defendant all his requirements for one or
more products. Defendant's sales of gasoline in the area resulting from such
contracts were approximately $57,000,000 which sum constituted 6.7% of
the total sale of gasoline for the area. The contracts were assailed as being
violative of § 3 of the Clayton Act. A decree enjoining defendant from enforcing or entering into such contracts was granted by the district court. On
appeal, Held, sales by the defendant constituted a substantial volume of business; therefore, the exclusive requirements contracts probably substantially
16. Louisville, C., & C. Ry. v. Letson, 2 How. 497 (U. S. 1844).
17. 28 U. S. C. A. § 1348 (1948).
18. 62 STAT, 869 (1948), 28 U. S. C. A. § 1332(b) (1948).

1. "It shall be unlawful for any person ... to , . . contract for sale of goods .. .
whether patented or unpatented ... on the condition ... that the purchaser thereof...
shall not deal in the goods ... of a competitor . . . where the effect of such . .. contract
I . . may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly . . ." 38
STAT. 731, 15 U. S. C. 14 (1914).

